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Abstract: This classroom exercise illustrates the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis that
residential sorting across multiple jurisdictions leads to a more efficient alloca-
tion of local public goods. The exercise places students with heterogeneous
preferences over a public good into a single classroom community. A simple
voting mechanism determines the level of public good provision in the com-
munity. Next, the classroom is divided in two, and students may choose to move
between the two smaller communities, sorting themselves according to their
preferences for public goods. The exercise places cost on movement at first,
then allows for costless sorting. Students have the opportunity to observe how
social welfare rises through successive rounds of the exercise, as sorting
becomes more complete. They may also observe how immobile individuals can
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become worse off because of incomplete sorting when the Tiebout assumptions
do not hold perfectly.
Key words: classroom experiments, public goods, residential sorting, Tiebout
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Students in undergraduate public finance courses learn that market provi-
sion of public goods is generally inefficient because of the nonexcludable and
nonrival characteristics of such goods. Centralized government provision of
locally consumed public goods may also prove inefficient because of hetero-
geneous preferences or heterogeneous opportunity costs. Neither centralized
nor market institutions are likely to provide local public goods efficiently.1
In a seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) suggested that the problem of efficient
local public goods provision can be solved through political institutions whose
outcomes resemble those of competitive markets.2 Tiebout argued that if a suf-
ficient number of communities existed to accommodate the different types of
preferences, individuals could sort themselves into communities that provide
their most desired (feasible) bundle of public goods and taxes. Competition
between communities ensures that local public goods are provided at the low-
est cost. Tiebout assumed that each community imposed a head tax equal to the
cost of provision divided by the community population. He further assumed
that a large number of communities exist to choose from; an optimal commu-
nity size for each pattern of tastes; no externalities or economies of scale; res-
idents have full information about available options; and sorting is costless.3
The resulting equilibrium allocation would maximize social welfare.
The following classroom demonstration is designed to illustrate the effi-
ciency gains that can arise from decentralization and local sorting, as well as
problems that arise when certain assumptions of the Tiebout model are not
met. The classroom at first comprises a single community of students with het-
erogeneous preferences for a public good (dorm parties); the students deter-
mine the level of taxation to be used for public good provision using a simple
voting mechanism. Next, the classroom divides into two communities, each of
which determines its own level of public good provision. Then, the students
have the opportunity to relocate to the community where the bundle of public
goods and taxes better suits their tastes. At first, some students must stay in
their original location, but in the final treatment, all students become mobile.
After each round of sorting, each community determines a new level of public
good provision. Students see how welfare rises as sorting becomes more com-
plete. This game illustrates the Tiebout sorting equilibrium and the possibility
of efficient provision of local public goods. It also highlights the usefulness of
markets in general and the assumptions necessary for a well-functioning mar-
ket to reach an efficient outcome. The third round of the exercise may foster
classroom discussion about white flight from inner-city school districts, as it
shows how some immobile individuals become worse off when mobile indi-
viduals move.334 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION
PROCEDURES
The classroom demonstration takes about 30 minutes, which leaves time for
class discussion afterward. The demonstration will work in classes with as few as
6 students or as many as 100 students, but the ideal class size is probably between
20 and 40. For large classes, teaching assistants will be required to aid in the
counting of votes. The exercise, although designed primarily for an undergradu-
ate public finance course, can be employed in any political science, public policy,
sociology, or economics course that covers government provision of public goods
or services.
Each student receives a packet that includes: (1) a colored set of instructions
with a record sheet (half the students receive red and half yellow), (2) a different
colored ribbon or index card (half the students receive white and half blue), and
optionally, (3) four ballots on which to write votes. The color of the instructions
denotes each student’s value for the public good, and the color of the ribbon or
index card denotes each student’s mobility (whether he or she may change com-
munities). It works well to put all the materials for each student into a large enve-
lope in advance of the class.
The overall distribution of packets in the class should be approximately half red
and half yellow, but the red and yellow packets should not be evenly distributed
between the two sides of the classroom. We recommend that packets be unevenly
distributed across the classroom after the students are seated. For example, two-
thirds of the packets on the right side of the classroom should be red, whereas two-
thirds of the packets on the left side of the classroom should be yellow. Students
are asked to open their packets and follow along as the instructions are read aloud.
The instructions include examples of how students calculate their individual wel-
fare at the end of each of four academic years (four rounds of the game). The only
difference between the red instructions and the yellow instructions is the assigned
formula for valuation of the public good, defined as dormitory parties and other
social events. Instructions and record sheets are provided in Appendixes A–C.
The students are informed that for year 1, they are residents in a single dorm
comprising all students in the classroom. To calculate after-tax welfare (explained
further later), each student is endowed with a spending allowance of $1,000 per
academic year. The dorm must collectively choose a level of entertainment and
associated per capita taxation between $0 and $100. Let E be the level of dorm
parties and entertainment.4 The per capita cost of a given level of entertainment
is E itself, indicating that the unit cost per capita is $1. Taxes, T,a re levied to
cover the cost of entertainment, so that T   E. Benefits derived from dorm par-
ties are 2   E for students with red instructions (high valuers) and 0   E for stu-
dents with yellow instructions (low valuers) (i.e., low-valuation students derive
no benefit from dorm parties). Net benefits as a function of taxes can then be writ-
ten as 2T – T for high-valuation students and –T for low-valuation students. The
value multiplied with the level of entertainment is referred to as “personal value
multiplier” on the instruction sheet. The instructor should stress to the students
that they have been assigned their personal value multiplier (some students may
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All students receive instructions revealing the gross benefit they receive from
parties and social events. By assumption, a unit of social events costs $1. Hence,
the marginal benefit of contributing always exceeds the marginal cost to the high-
valuation students, whereas the marginal cost always exceeds the marginal bene-
fit to the low-valuation students. To motivate students to participate in this
demonstration, instructors may wish to announce in advance that at the end of the
experiment one student will be selected randomly to receive some fraction of his
or her payoff in cash (e.g., 1/1000th).
In each year of the game, the entire class votes for a level of social-event tax-
ation.5 The simple public-choice mechanism, which is repeated in each year,
works as follows: The instructor announces three possible choices of T on the 
ballot—$0, $50, or $100. Residents are polled on their preferred level. Low-
valuation residents should prefer T   $0, and high-valuation residents should pre-
fer T   $100. The T   $50 option allows a choice for students who are either
confused or altruistic and makes students less suspicious that the deck is stacked
in favor of a certain outcome. After tallying the votes, the instructor sets the level
of T at the weighted average of the three options: T*   p0($0)   p50($50)  
p100($100), where pi is the fraction of votes in favor of choice i. Calculating the
outcome of this vote is the most time-consuming part of the exercise. In a class
of 30–40 students, a simple hand count might be used, but in larger classes, paper
ballots may help to facilitate the process. 
The instructor enters the votes each option receives into a spreadsheet, which
calculates the voted-upon tax level, T*.6 Students calculate their after-tax welfare
after each vote according to the T* that has been chosen and announced. For high-
valuation students, the calculation is $1,000   (2T*) – T*. For low-valuation stu-
dents, the calculation is $1,000   (0T*) – T*.7 After the students have an
opportunity to compute their after-tax welfare, the instructor should ask for a
show of hands on the questions: “How many of you are receiving after-tax wel-
fare greater than your initial spending allowance of $1,000?” and “How many
have less than your initial spending allowance of $1,000?” Individuals who raise
their hand to the first question are high-valuation types, assuming the students
have computed their individual welfare correctly. The balance of the class is made
up of low-valuation types. The instructor will then enter the number of each type
into the spreadsheet to calculate the social welfare (Ws) for the class as follows:
Ws   (NH) (1,000   2T* – T*)   (NL) (1,000 – 0T* – T*)   (NH) (1,000   T*)  
(NL) (1,000 – T*), where NH equals the number of high-valuation students and NL
the number of low-valuation students. 
In year 2, the classroom is divided into two separate dorms (Left and Right).
This can be done by means of a volunteer or teaching assistant in the back of the
classroom and a roll of string or toilet paper. The roll is tossed to the volunteer
and allowed to unroll in the air, neatly dividing the class roughly in half, into left
and right dormitories. Each half of the class now votes on a separate level of tax-
ation, T, and hence public good provision, E. Again, students calculate their after-
tax welfare and the instructor enters TL* for Left and TR* for Right into the
spreadsheet. In each community, the instructor now asks: “How many of you have
improved your after-tax welfare from the previous year’s after-tax welfare?” and“How many of you now have a lower after-tax welfare than you did in the previ-
ous year?” In contrast to year 1, this and all subsequent years frame the question
in terms of after-tax welfare relative to the previous year. This is done to illustrate
that most people become better off as communities separate into different types,
even low types who are receiving a net loss from taxation. 
If the packets were initially distributed in the recommended uneven fashion
(two-thirds red in one-half of the class and two-thirds yellow in the other half),
then social welfare will rise in year 2. This occurs because the level of T chosen
in the two communities will reflect the differences in preferences for the public
good. Different levels of the local public good will provide a clear signal to resi-
dents about the community they will want to choose in year 3, when mobility is
allowed.8 In our experience, simply allowing students to observe the different tax
levels imposed by the two dorms has provided a sufficient signal to prompt 
students to sort themselves according to their preferences. An alternative would
be to allow students to send explicit signals. For example, at this point in the
demonstration, students in the Right dorm might announce, “If you like parties,
this is the dorm for you!” Likewise, students assigned to the Left dorm might
announce, “If you want lower taxes, move Left.”
In year 3, certain individuals are permitted to switch communities to take
advantage of a more appealing package of a public good and related tax. Students
who change communities should physically change their location in the class-
room. Those who have received a blue ribbon or index card are entitled to move
freely. They can be thought of as having sufficient additional income to afford
some fixed cost of moving or as having no other nonfinancial constraints on mov-
ing. A toll bridge between the communities may be set up, in which the instruc-
tor collects a toll in the form of the blue card or ribbon from anyone who wishes
to pass. Those without a blue pass must remain in their original community. After
sorting, voting for tax rates takes place again in both communities, and T* for
each community is calculated. Students again calculate their after-tax welfare,
and the instructor again surveys the class and calculates social welfare. The
instructor should repeat the questions: “How many of you have improved your
after-tax welfare from the previous year’s after-tax welfare?” and “How many of
you now have a lower after-tax welfare than you did in the previous year?”
It is worth noting that although generally social welfare will have risen in years
2 and 3, the welfare of some individuals may have fallen. These will be either
low-valuation types whose taxes have increased over the previous round or high-
valuation types whose taxes have decreased. In the classroom discussion at the
end, especially with regard to costly mobility, it is worth noting why the welfare
of some individuals fell in years 2 and 3.
In year 4, individuals are told that mobility is costless. Everyone is allowed to
choose freely the community that best suits them. Once again, some students will
migrate across the classroom from one community into another. When students
have settled into their chosen communities the instructor determines TL* and TR*,
calculates individual and social welfare, and posts results. 
As a final gesture, all students are asked to hold up their colored record sheet.
The students should observe that most, if not all, residents of each community
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local public good. As the Tiebout hypothesis predicts, individuals sort themselves
into communities made up of others with similar preferences for public goods, in
this case, by the red and yellow record sheets.9 Students should also note that
everyone’s welfare rose in year 4, and social welfare moved to the highest level
in the demonstration.
DISCUSSION
This exercise can generate a rich class discussion. To begin, the instructor may
use the exercise to highlight the predictions and assumptions of the model. 
Assuming the packets were distributed in an uneven fashion, the two commu-
nities (dorms) in year 2 should choose different levels of taxation depending on
their dominant preference type. The dorm with more high types should vote for
higher taxes; the other dorm, with more low types, should vote for lower taxes.
On average, more of each type had their preference more closely satisfied in 
year 2 versus year 1, increasing total social welfare. This is not to say that
everyone’s individual welfare improved. Low-valuation types are forced to
spend some of their allowance on dorm social events (more so in one dorm than
the other).
When partial mobility was allowed in year 3 (only the people with blue cards
or ribbons could switch dorms), the equilibrium level of the local public good in
the two communities should further diverge. In each dorm, some individuals in
the minority were able to move to the other community so social welfare further
improved.
Once mobility was completely free, the Tiebout predictions should be realized
because everyone could move to the dorm of their choice. Those with preferences
for spending their money on dorm parties and social events now live in a dorm
with a high social-event tax, whereas the other students end up keeping their entire
spending allowance and live in a dorm with no community-provided social events. 
In the process of a classroom discussion, certain conclusions should be empha-
sized. First, both types of individuals experience welfare gains by the end of the
game. Low-valuation students start with a negative net benefit and end with a net
benefit of zero.10 High-valuation students will also improve their welfare compared
with their initial welfare prior to an increase in a number of communities and free
mobility. When students are not allowed to move (i.e., in year 2 or without a blue
ribbon or card in year 3), some may experience a drop in their welfare compared
with year 1. Class discussion questions may include the following: What changes
result in increases in individual welfare over time? Does welfare only go up for an
individual when the individual moves? What about individuals who never move?
Does their welfare change as a result of other people moving? When does the
migration of other people raise an individual’s welfare, and when does it lower it?
Does the situation improve in aggregate? What about for each individual? 
The classroom discussion should focus on how individual and total welfare
change over the successive years of the demonstration and emphasize changes in
social welfare. It is worth showing the social welfare calculation from the
Fall 2005 337spreadsheet for each year, so students can observe the progression. By the end
of year 4, most students realize that when similar individuals perfectly sort
themselves into communities according to their taste for a public good, social
welfare is maximized.
The game and the follow-up discussion should vividly illustrate the concepts
of the Tiebout model for the students. A broader discussion can then begin regard-
ing the complexities of public goods and the importance of the assumptions of the
model. A good place to start might be to have students discuss their own experi-
ence with residential choice and the communities in which they have lived. How
did their family decide where to locate? Did the quality of the schools or other
local public goods like overall safety (police, fire protection) or amenities (parks,
libraries) matter to their decision? Do they believe everyone in their community
wants exactly the same thing from the local government? In other words, just how
complete is the residential sorting they observe in the real world? The instructor
may list the different residential selection factors on the board and then ask
whether the assumptions are likely to hold in the real world.
In general, it is important to emphasize the implications of relaxing the model’s
assumptions. There are many questions the instructor could pose. What happens
if we have more than two types of residents but only two communities? Can wel-
fare be perfectly maximized by costless sorting? Or, what if there are differences
in the efficient size of the community for the provision of different local public
goods? In this case, a single household would belong to multiple local public-
good communities (for example, the city provides police protection, a district
provides schools, and a county provides parks). Will efficient levels be reached?
Apart from Tiebout’s assumptions, in this experiment, we assumed that all stu-
dents have the same level of income. How could the sorting outcome differ in the
case of heterogeneous income levels and homogenous preferences? What about
with both heterogeneous income and heterogeneous preferences?
Perhaps most interesting is a discussion of the costless mobility assumption.
Students should be able to come up with several reasons why moving might be
costly. For example, some residents may need to locate near places of employ-
ment, which is a function of individuals’ labor mobility. In addition, there are
fixed costs of moving, such as fees involved in buying and selling a house or rent-
ing an apartment. Other individuals may find that nonpecuniary costs are equally
important. For instance, many people value living near their relatives and friends,
or simply dislike moving and adjusting to a new environment. In this case, the
sorting is incomplete and the equilibrium outcome is inefficient. 
The implications of imperfect sorting are wide ranging. For example, hetero-
geneous income levels and resulting differences in mobility may result in inferior
public education opportunities for some families that place high valuation on
quality education. A class discussion of state and federal grants and subsidies to
local education can follow from this, as well as debate over school voucher pro-
grams. In addition, other barriers to mobility such as housing discrimination
might prevent optimal sorting outcomes. 
The basic framework of this demonstration is flexible enough to allow
for numerous extensions emphasizing different aspects of local public good
338 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC EDUCATIONprovision. For example, instructors in advanced courses may want to introduce
multiple public goods, then allow students to coordinate to form an endoge-
nously determined number of distinct communities. Instructors can also exper-
iment with different voting mechanisms, for example, replacing the
weighted-average mechanism with a simple-plurality rule. This is a fairly
straightforward alternative to the mechanism described here, and in our expe-
rience, it leads to the same sorting outcome. Yet another alternative would be
for instructors to allow for a median-voter setup where mayoral candidates
commit to a level of T. Endogenizing candidates’ platform choice in this way
would add time and complication to the demonstration, but this may be war-
ranted for advanced classes in political economy.
FURTHER READING
We have briefly surveyed the classic articles from the public good provision
and local residential sorting literatures. This discussion is meant primarily as a
quick reference for instructors and as a guide for students interested in further
studying this area of economic thought.
The starting point of the literature on the provision of public goods was
Samuelson’s seminal piece “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure” (1954),
which showed that the private production of public goods is inefficient. Because
markets are unable to provide public goods, attention focused on the possibility
of government provision of these goods. However, without market prices as sig-
nals, the fundamental problem is to ascertain the individual’s valuation of a pub-
lic good. Clarke (1971), Groves (1973), and Groves and Ledyard (1977) made
important contributions to this literature by designing preference revelation
mechanisms. Tiebout (1956), on the other hand, argued that one could return to
the principles of the market to uncover consumers’ valuation for some types of
public goods. For local public goods at least, competition among local jurisdic-
tions can lead to an efficient provision. Consumers, facing a number of commu-
nities with different levels of taxes and local public goods, reveal their true
valuation of the local public good by moving to the community that most closely
mirrors their preferences. In this article, Tiebout demonstrates to undergraduates
that important innovations in economic theory can be conceived and expressed in
a nontechnical way. For a good general discussion of the Tiebout model in the
context of fiscal federalism and an undergraduate public-finance class, see
Hyman (2002) or Stiglitz (2000).
The conceptual ideas Tiebout presented have made a lasting contribution in
many different areas of the social sciences. In the field of economics, the
Tiebout hypothesis plays an important role in questions of school choice
(Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts 1987) and tax capitalization (Bloom, Ladd,
and Yinger 1983; Mieszkowski and Zodrow 1989). In addition, Tiebout’s basic
idea that communities compete for residents has been borrowed in the litera-
ture about firm location and tax-competition policy (Brueckner 2000). The
idea of sorting in a nonspatial dimension is also important in Buchanan’s
(1965) work on clubs. 
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Tiebout’s contribution also extends to other fields. In particular, political 
scientists have explored whether the Tiebout results apply in different political or
voting regimes (Kollman, Miller, and Page 1997). The Tiebout model also under-
lies research on the political implications of devolution, especially the expecta-
tion that state governments will “race to the bottom” in their provision of social
welfare benefits, competing for productive capital and avoiding redistributive
policies (Brace 1993; Peterson 1981; Donahue 1997). Political scientists have
also investigated the microfoundations of the Tiebout model, especially whether
individuals are sufficiently informed and mobile to sort themselves (Bickers and
Stein 1998; Lowery, Lyons, and Hoogland DeHoog 1995; Peterson and Rom
1989; Teske, Schneider, Mintrom, and Best 1993).
NOTES
1. The discussion is usually found in the context of fiscal federalism. For example, see Hyman
(2002), Rosen (2005), or Stiglitz (2000).
2. Tiebout’s main focus is not pure public goods such as defense but public goods that are at least
partially rival in consumption (e.g., space on a crowded beach, seats in a classroom). Such serv-
ices are sometimes characterized as publicly provided private goods (see Rosen 2005). 
3. Tiebout also lists two other assumptions. He excludes employment factors from the analysis and
also imposes the assumption that city planners try to achieve the efficient community size. This
last assumption is equivalent to minimizing the average cost of production of the local public
good in each community.
4. We chose dorm parties as our local public good because, like the goods that are the focus of
Tiebout’s (1956) work, they are provided locally (within a single dorm or hallway) but are par-
tially rival in consumption. During the postexperiment discussion, the instructor may choose to
elicit from students how parties might be considered public goods without being pure public
good—for example, whereas entertainment and decorations tend to be nonrival, refreshments
tend to be rival in consumption. The instructor could then ask students for examples of goods or
services provided by local governments that are nonexcludable but rival.
5. Note that at this point we abstract from the Tiebout (1956) model. In Tiebout’s framework, there
exist a multitude of community planners that compete for residents by setting the level of the local
public good and corresponding tax level. Consumers then choose among the different communi-
ties to find their most preferred bundle of public good level and taxes. In our framework, we have
replaced the community planners by eliciting consumer preferences. Although this is technically
not how Tiebout framed his model, it accomplishes the same task as Tiebout’s community plan-
ners and allows for more involvement by the students.
6. An Excel spreadsheet for calculating social welfare, a worksheet for calculating social welfare with-
out a computer, sample ballots to be used in larger classes, and a set of annotated instructions for
the instructor can be downloaded at: http://economics.kenyon.edu/corrigan/tiebout/tiebout.htm.
7. Note that because the good is (partially) rival, students do not consume the entire good nT* but
only a share of the total T*.
8. If the division of the original community into two communities led to equal levels of T in both,
coordination would be required to find the sorting equilibrium. This could be done but would take
additional time. Hence, the recommended uneven initial distribution of types (packets). 
9. In our experience, between 90 and 100 percent of the students in each dorm will be of the
expected type. 
10. For those students troubled by zero net benefit being a “good” outcome, this may be a good time
to clarify the idea of ordinal utility.
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APPENDIX A. INSTRUCTIONS FOR LOW-VALUE RESIDENTS
Instructions for the Local Public Good Game
Suppose you live in a dorm that is deciding how much money to raise for a collective fund
that will be spent on parties and social events for your dorm. Your dorm is voting on the amount
of money that each resident will equally contribute to the fund for the current school year.
Your room, board, and tuition are already paid for, and you have a spending allowance of
$1000 at the beginning of each year that you may use freely for entertainment, books, etc. 
The dorm will decide on a level of per-capita taxation, T, between $0 and $100, which
will be paid out of your $1000 spending account. The level of taxation will represent the
number of dollars in taxes that you and everyone else in your dorm must each pay. These
taxes will be used to sponsor social events in your dorm. Residents of your hypothetical
dorm enjoy these social events differently. As a result, you have each been assigned a per-
sonal value multiplier. You cannot change the assigned multiplier. 
Your personal value multiplier is 0.
To calculate the value you derive from your dorm’s parties and social events, take your
personal value multiplier times T. In your case, the value you derive would be (0   T). As
other people may have different values, we ask that you keep your value private.
In addition to these instructions, you have received a record sheet. You will be using this
sheet to record the level of taxes, T, imposed by the dorm, as well as the value that you
receive from the parties that are funded by these taxes. You will also calculate your 
Fall 2005 341after-tax welfare: that is, the value of your spending account ($1000), minus the taxes you pay,
plus your own personal value of the social events. Here’s the way your record sheet will look:
Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account $1,000
PLUS
Your value of the social events (  0   T) ______
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (  T) ______
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare ======
To determine the taxation level, the dorm’s governing committee will survey its resi-
dents. They will ask which of three possible taxation levels you prefer: $0, $50, or $100.
They will then calculate the average of your choices and impose that average as the taxa-
tion level.
Are there any questions so far?
Let’s work through an example.
Imagine that there are 10 residents in your dorm and that 2 of them vote for a level of
$0 taxes, none vote for $50, and 8 vote for $100. The average choice is then 
(2   $0)   (0   $50)   (8   $100) 
  $80 10
so the taxation level will be $80 for everyone in the dorm. We have used this information
to calculate your after-tax welfare on the following practice worksheet:
Level of taxation chosen (T): $80
Your spending account $1,000
PLUS
Your value of the social events  (  0   T)   $0   
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events  (  T)   $80
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare  $920   ________
Are there any final questions before we begin?
Your local government will now conduct its first survey. Take a moment to think about
which of the following three options you prefer:
•T axation of $0
•T axation of $50
•T axation of $100
After the vote is taken, we will announce the results and will then proceed to the next year.
At the beginning of each year, you will be given verbal instructions related to that par-
ticular year. Please listen carefully and do not hesitate to ask questions if you have them.
APPENDIX B. INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIGH-VALUE RESIDENTS
Instructions for the Local Public Good Game
Suppose you live in a dorm that is deciding how much money to raise for a collective
fund that will be spent on parties and social events for your dorm. Your dorm is voting on
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the amount of money that each resident will equally contribute to the fund for the current
school year.
Your room, board, and tuition are already paid for, and you have a spending allowance of
$1000 at the beginning of each year that you may use freely for entertainment, books, etc.
The dorm will decide on a level of per-capita taxation, T,between $0 and $100, which will
be paid out of your $1000 spending account. The level of taxation will represent the number
of dollars in taxes that you and everyone else in your dorm must each pay. These taxes will
be used to sponsor social events in your dorm. Residents of your hypothetical dorm enjoy
these social events differently. As a result, you have each been assigned a personal value mul-
tiplier. You cannot change the assigned multiplier.
Your personal value multiplier is 2.
To calculate the value you derive from your dorm’s parties and social events, take your
personal value multiplier times T. In your case, the value you derive would be (2   T). As
other people may have different values, we ask that you keep your value private.
In addition to these instructions, you have received a record sheet. You will be using this
sheet to record the level of taxes, T, imposed by the dorm, as well as the value that you
receive from the parties that are funded by these taxes. You will also calculate your after-tax
welfare: that is, the value of your spending account ($1000), minus the taxes you pay, plus
your own personal value of the social events. Here’s the way your record sheet will look:
Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account $1,000
PLUS
Your value of the social events (  2   T) ______
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (  T) ______
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare =======
To determine the taxation level, the dorm’s governing committee will survey its residents.
They will ask which of three possible taxation levels you prefer: $0, $50, or $100. They will
then calculate the average of your choices and impose that average as the taxation level.
Are there any questions so far?
Let’s work through an example.
Imagine that there are 10 residents in your dorm, and that 2 of them vote for a level of
$0 taxes, none vote for $50, and 8 vote for $100. The average choice is then 
(2   $0)   (0   $50)   (8   $100) 
  $80
10
so the taxation level will be $80 for everyone in the dorm. We have used this information
to calculate your after-tax welfare on the following practice worksheet:
Level of taxation chosen (T):   $80   
Your spending account $1,000
PLUS
Your value of the social events  (  2   T)    $160 
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events  (  T)      $80  
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare  $1080  __________344 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION
Are there any final questions before we begin?
Your local government will now conduct its first survey. Take a moment to think about
which of the following three options you prefer:
•T axation of $0
•T axation of $50
•T axation of $100
After the vote is taken, we will announce the results and will then proceed to the
next year.
At the beginning of each year, you will be given verbal instructions related to that par-
ticular year. Please listen carefully and do not hesitate to ask questions if you have them.
APPENDIX C. STUDENT RECORD SHEET
Year 1 Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account  $1,000
PLUS
Your value of the social events  (  PVM   T) ______
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (  T) ______
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare _______
Year 2 Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account $1,000
PLUS
Your value of the social events (  PVM   T) ______
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events (  T) ______
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare ______
Year 3 Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account  $1,000
PLUS
Your value of the social events  (  PVM   T) ______
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events  (  T) ______
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare ______
Year 4 Level of taxation chosen (T): ______
Your spending account $1,000
PLUS
Your value of the social events (  PVM   T) ______
MINUS
Your tax payment for the social events  (  T) ______
EQUALS
Your after-tax welfare ______ _______
_______
_______
_______